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Doctors Can "Just Say No": The
Constitutionality of Consumer-Directed




Americans who suffer from arthritis, allergies, baldness, heart ail-
ments, or who use oral contraceptives or want to quit smoking, may now
learn of prescription remedies without a physician's guidance-through
advertising directly targeted at them. Until 1988, the general consensus
within the pharmaceutical industry was that federal law prohibited ad-
vertising of prescription drugs by name to the general public., Federal
law has not changed, but the industry's opinion has. The Upjohn Com-
pany blazed the trail in late 1989 with advertisement of its anti-baldness
treatment by name;2 other pharmaceutical companies have since found it
desirable to follow suit. One explanation may be that, as brand-name
drugs' patents expire, the drug manufacturers are concerned with main-
taining the lead against generic drug manufacturers.
The biggest explosion caused by these ads is not in their numbers,
but in the surrounding ethical debate. The interests of three groups are
at stake: consumers/patients, physicians, and manufacturers. Advertis-
ing prescription drugs to the public meets strong opposition from mem-
bers of Congress, certain consumer groups, and the medical profession.
The arguments against advertising such products include harm to the
consumer/patient, harm to the patient-doctor relationship, increased
costs of drugs, increased demand for drugs, unnecessary drug consump-
tion and, that this type of commercial speech is unprotected by the first
amendment.
* B.A. University of California, Los Angeles, 1985; J.D., University of California, Has-
tings College of the Law, 1990. This Note is dedicated to my parents, Janet and Morton
Ehrlich, for their endless support and encouragement.
1. Horovitz, Upjohn Must Keep a Cool Head in Marketing its Baldness Drug, L.A.
Times, Aug. 19, 1988, at D1, col. 3.
2. Bernstein, Prescription Drugs: Pitching Directly to the Patient, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, Jan. 15, 1990, at 46.
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This Note will first discuss the current statutory and regulatory pro-
visions governing prescription drug advertising and demonstrate how
they apply to the current debate. The focus is on whether advertising of
specific prescription drugs directly to the consumer is protected speech
under the first amendment of the United States Constitution. Following
a discussion of relevant historical development and current commercial
speech standards, the Note examines the application of the current doc-
trine to prescription drug advertising and reports on recent develop-
ments. This Note concludes (1) that such advertising is constitutionally
protected if current Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requirements
are satisfied because (a) the potential benefits and interests of the public
are then best served, and (b) the benefits substantially outweigh the con-
flicting interests at stake.
I
Regulation of Prescription Drug Advertising
Congress passed the Pure Food and Drug Act3 in 1906 to prevent
the "manufacture, sale, or transportation of adulterated or misbranded
or poisonous or deleterious ... drugs."4 The Act was repealed in 1938
and replaced by the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, under which
drugs continue to be regulated.5 The primary purpose behind the 1938
statute remained the same: to protect the public health.6 However, the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act differentiates between two general classes
of drugs. The first category comprises those which require medical ex-
pertise for diagnosis and proper use, have higher potency and higher
risks associated with their use, and are available only with a written pre-
scription from a licensed practitioner. In the second class are those
drugs which do not require particular medical expertise for diagnosis and
proper use and can be used safely by consumers without an intermediate
professional. Since they may be obtained without a prescription,' they
are commonly known as "over-the-counter" drugs (OTCs).
Section 352(n) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act concerns the
advertising and misbranding of prescription drugs.8 The section provides
that regulations "shall be issued by the Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services in accordance with the procedure specified
3. Pure Food and Drug Act, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906).
4. Id. at 768. A person found to have violated the provisions of the Act was guilty of a
misdemeanor punishable by a $500 fine or one year in prison, or both. Id.
5. Ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-93 (1988)).
6. United States v. Lexington Mill, 232 U.S. 399 (1914).
7. 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1) (1988).
8. 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (1988).
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in section 371(a)" of the same title.9 Section 371(a) provides that the
Secretary has "authority to promulgate regulations" for the enforcement
of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. " Pursuant to this provision, the
FDA is charged with the actual administration of the Act since the FDA
is under the auspices of the Department of Health and Human
Services. 11
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act provides that a drug "shall be
deemed misbranded ... unless the manufacturer ... includes in all ad-
vertisements and other descriptive printed matter issued.., a true state-
ment of (1) the established name ... printed prominently . . . , (2) the
formula... and (3) such other information in brief summary relating to
side effects, contraindications, and effectiveness as shall be required" by
the FDA regulations.12
Given its authority,13 the FDA has promulgated extensive and de-
tailed regulations 4 for the advertising of prescription drugs to prevent
consumer deception and confusion. These regulations mandate the in-
clusion of certain information in prescription drug advertisements and
set forth specific guidelines regarding information which the manufacture
is not required to include, because the audience originally intended for
such promotion was health-care professionals.15 For example, drug in-
gredients must be listed in the advertisement in the same way as is re-
quired on the product's corresponding label (in the same order and with
the same quantity information). Also, the drug manufacturer may not
advertise its product by a fanciful name which falsely implies that a com-
9. Id.
10. 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (1988).
11. Reorg. Plan No. IV of 1940, §§ 12, 13, 5 Fed. Reg. 2421, 2422 (1940), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. app. at 1233-34 (1988), and in 54 Stat. 1234, 1237. The FDA was originally under the
Federal Security Agency whose functions were transferred to the Department of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare. Reorg. Plan No. I of 1953, § 5, 18 Fed. Reg. 2053 (1953), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. app. at 1278 (1988), and in 67 Stat. 631, 632. The name was subsequently changed to
the Department of Health and Human Services. Pub. L. 96-88, § 508(g), 93 Stat. 668, 692
(1979).
12. 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (1988).
13. There is some conflict over whether the FDA has exclusive jurisdiction in this area or
whether there is concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The FTC
regulates advertising of over-the-counter drugs. Novitch, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of
Prescription Drugs, 39 FooD DRUG & COSMETIC L.J. 306, 306 n.4 (1984). In 1983, the FDA
asserted that jurisdiction over prescription drugs was exclusively within the authority of the
FDA, while the FTC expressed the opinion that under 21 U.S.C. § 352(n), the FDA and FTC
have concurrent jurisdiction. Staff of House Subcommittee on Energy and Commerce, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess., Report on Prescription Drug Advertising to Consumers 49-51, 58 (Comm.
Print 1984) [hereinafter Comm. Print 1984]. This conflict has not been resolved.
14. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1989).
15. Novitch, supra note 13, at 307. See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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mon drug has some unique effectiveness or composition.' 6 The regula-
tions further provide detailed rules for how the proprietary name as well
as the established name 7 of a drug must be displayed. 8 Finally, the
FDA regulations specify what information must be included in "brief
summary" for both print and broadcast advertisements.1 9
Three categories of drug advertisements are exempt from the re-
quirement of the "brief summary" materials:20 reminder advertisements,
advertisements of bulk-sale drugs, and advertisements of prescription
compounding drugs. Reminder advertisements are those which merely
name the product, list its ingredients, and include price information
without making any suggestions about the effectiveness of the product.
Such advertisements are not permitted for drugs with labels containing
the boxed warnings of possible serious hazards associated with their uses.
Reminder ads are intended merely to convey price information to con-
sumers, doctors, or pharmacists. If the FDA Commissioner finds such
ads misleading, he or she may order them discontinued.2" Advertise-
ments of bulk-sale drugs are directed only to those within the trade and
contain no claims of safety or effectiveness. Balk-sale drugs are intended
to be processed, manufactured, or repackaged. If these ads do contain
claims of safety or efficacy, they will not be exempt.22 Advertisements
for prescription compounding drugs also are directed only to those
within the trade. Such ads contain no claims of the safety or effectiveness
of a drug and are intended only to promote the sale of drugs to pharma-
cists for use in compounds.23
If a prescription drug advertisement is not covered under one of the
above three exemptions, it is subject to a number of FDA regulations.24
These regulations specify the scope of the material which the advertiser
must include in the "brief summary., 25 Generally, drug manufacturers
may not include untrue or misleading information in any part of the ad-
vertisement. The advertisement must include a discussion of effective-
ness but this may be limited to "selected purpose[s] for which the drug is
16. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(a)(l)-(3) (1989).
17. A drug's label must include only the drug's "established name" along with the propri-
etary name. No other nonproprietary names may be included. 21 U.S.C. § 352(e)(1) (1988).
The "established name" of a drug or ingredient is the "applicable official name designated
pursuant to section 358." 21 U.S.C. § 352(e)(3) (1988).
18. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(b)-(d) (1989).
19. Id. § 202.1(e)(1) (1988).
20. Id. § 202.1(e)(2) (1989).
21. Id. § 202.1(e)(2)(i).
22. Id. § 202. l(e)(2)(ii).
23. Id. § 202.1(e)(2)(iii).
24. Id. § 202.1(e).
25. Id. § 202.1(e)(3)-(4).
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recommended or suggested in the advertisement. '26 It is also necessary
that the "brief summary" present a "fair balance between information
relating to side effects and contraindications and information relating to
effectiveness of the drug."' 27 Furthermore, since an advertisement may
not be "false, lacking in fair balance, or otherwise misleading,"28 the
FDA regulations provide twenty examples of impermissible advertising
to guide advertisers.29 For instance, an advertisement would be consid-
ered misleading if it contained favorable conclusions from a nonclinical
study of a drug and seemed to suggest that the conclusions had "clinical
significance when in fact no clinical significance ha[d] been demon-
strated."30 But, these provisions may be circumvented if a drug manu-
facturer can show that the advertisement does not violate section 352(n)
of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.3 In order to do this, the adver-
tiser would have to show that while the ad may on its face appear false,
misleading, or lacking in fair balance, upon closer examination, it really
is accurate.
The pharmaceutical trade generally must police itself because prior
approval of advertisements by the FDA is only required in special cases,
not routinely.32 The dissemination of a drug advertisement which does
not comply with the federal regulations is an act which deems the drug
"misbranded" under section 352(n) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act. A federal court may enjoin the misbranding of drugs, under section




Interpretation of the Regulations-Regarding
Prescription Drug Advertising to Consumers
As they currently stand, both the statutory provisions in the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the FDA regulations promulgated
thereunder do not specifically prohibit prescription drug advertising di-
rectly to the consumer. However, it cannot be presumed that the regula-
tions permit such advertising. Although the statute does not distinguish
the intended audience for prescription drug ads, "at the time [of draft-
ing], health professionals, primarily physicians, were perceived as the
26. Id § 202. 1(e)(3)(ii).
27. Id. § 202. 1(e)(5)(i).
28. Id § 202. 1(e)(6).
29. Id § 202. 1(e)(6)(i)-(xx).
30. Id § 202.1(e)(6)(vii).
31. Id § 202.1(e)(6)(xx).
32. Id § 202.10).
33. 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), 332(a), 333(a) (1988).
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only intended audience for such promotion." '34 FDA Commissioner
Arthur Hayes confirmed this position in August 1983 when he responded
to the inquiries of a congressional committee. He stated that possible
regulation of prescription drug advertising to the general public should
be the result of a "conscious decision, following comprehensive public
discussion and not of the adventitious fact that the current regulations do
not, as a practical matter, permit something they were not intended to
address."3"
In early 1982, in a speech to the Pharmaceutical Advertising Coun-
cil, Commissioner Hayes speculated that there would be much growth in
prescription drug advertising to consumers as a result of pharmaceutical
manufacturers' increased interest in it.36 At that time, prescription con-
tact lenses were already widely advertised to the general public, and
"[m]arketers of intrauterine contraceptive devices [had] shown an inter-
est in direct to consumer ads."37 Several other factors provided back-
ground to Commissioner Hayes' opinion, including a general consumer
movement urging patients to become more involved in their own health-
care, the increased availability of generic drugs, and the popularity of
healthcare books with the general public.3"
Representatives John Dingell,39 Henry Waxman,' and Edward
Markey,'" members of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investiga-
tions of the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Repre-
sentatives (House Subcommittee), opposed prescription drug advertising
to consumers and expressed their concerns to FDA Commissioner
Hayes. In 1983, in response to inquiries from Representative Dingell,
Commissioner Hayes called for a moratorium on prescription drug ad-
vertising to consumers so that the FDA could conduct research before
taking a definite stance on the issue. At that time, the FDA still allowed
the Cable Health Network to sell time for prescription drug advertise-
ments which would air during programs directed to physicians. Even
though it was possible that a layperson might view such a program, the
34. Novitch, supra note 13, at 307. See also Johnstone, Special Problems in Direct-to-
Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs, 42 FOOD DRUG & COSMETIC L.J. 315, 316
(1987).
35. Comm. Print 1984, supra note 13, at 57.
36. Id. at 14-40. See also Johnstone, supra note 34, at 316.
37. Comm. Print 1984, supra note 13, at 25.
38. Id at 12.
39. Representative Dingell (D-Mich.) is the chairperson of both the Committee on Energy
and Commerce for the House of Representatives as well as the Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations [hereinafter House Subcommittee].
40. Representative Waxman (D-Cal.) is a member of the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce.
41. Representative Markey (D-Mass.) is a member of the House Subcommittee.
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ads were permitted because the entire brief summary as required by cur-
rent statutes was included.42
The moratorium was rescinded in 1985."3 At this point, the FDA
did not make any changes in existing regulations. It was the position of
the FDA that the existing regulations provided "sufficient safeguards to
protect consumers."'  This determination served as confirmation of
Hayes' position in 1982 that there was no need to modify the regulations
since prescription drug regulations were the "most stringent advertising
regulations for any product in commerce."45 Before the moratorium was
lifted, some pharmaceutical manufacturers had already begun running
"institutional" ads directed at the general public." Institutional ads dis-
cuss general conditions or symptoms of illnesses and urge readers or
viewers to see their doctors for appropriate medication. In these ads, the
specific names of drugs or products are not mentioned, just the name of
the manufacturing company. Because these ads, by definition, did not
mention specific products, they were not believed to trigger the FDA
regulations and were therefore permissible without inclusion of the "brief
summary.'
47
The precise issue has narrowed. The question has become whether
product-specific advertising is permitted to be directed to the consumer.
If the answer is "yes, as long as the current FDA requirements are met,"
then the practical difficulties of meeting these requirements must still be
overcome. For print advertisements, the "brief summary" material must
be written in a non-misleading, clear manner so that the layperson can
understand it. This is a difficult task since some feel this type of informa-
tion will be inherently misleading to the consumer. 48 The use of broad-
cast media for drug advertisements presents additional problems;
innovation of media technique is necessary in order to satisfy the FDA
requirements.49 In May 1989, Kenneth Feather, acting director of the
42. Johnstone, supra note 34, at 316-17.
43. 50 Fed. Reg. 36,677 (1985).
44. Id. at 36,678.
45. Hayes expressed this to Representative Dingell in a letter dated May 19, 1982. Hayes
did not "anticipate a need to modify the regulations to deal with the consumer-oriented adver-
tising" because he felt the regulations were already very strict. Comm. Print 1984, supra note
13, at 13.
46. Johnstone, supra note 34, at 318.
47. Presumably, the moratorium did not affect the three categories of drug advertisements
exempt under the regulations. This is so since, by definition, either the audience is not the
general public, or information contained in the ad is limited to price. Johnstone, supra note 34,
at 318.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 125-28.
49. Some techniques include crawling the brief summary on the screen behind some other
visuals, and the use of bold headlines. Johnstone, supra note 34, at 316. Because these tech-
niques often require longer advertisements, they are more expensive for advertisers. See infra
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FDA's Drug Advertising Division, indicated that the FDA would not
try to affect the status quo.5" It would not encourage product-specific
ads nor tighten the regulations. However, there are many who feel pre-
scription drug advertising to consumers should be prohibited because the
potential harm outweighs any possible benefits. For instance, the House
Subcommittee, after investigating this issue, argued in a 1984 Staff Re-
port that broadcast advertising of prescription drugs directly to the con-
sumer is not, nor should be, constitutionally protected." The House
Subcommittee additionally argued that such advertising could not be reg-
ulated effectively in order for its benefits to outweigh its risks. Groups
opposing such advertising include physicians 2 and pharmaceutical man-
ufacturers, 53 as well as consumer groups 4 such as the American Associa-
tion of Retired Persons, which advocates for the elderly, and the Public
Citizen Health Research Group, a "watchdog" organization based in
Washington, D.C. 55 It remains to be seen whether the opposition will
effect a change in the law.
III
Constitutionality
A. Evolution of Commercial Speech Doctrine
Commercial advertising has been held to be a form of speech' 6 pro-
tected by the first amendment of the United States Constitution. 57 Com-
mercial speech is speech which does "no more than propose a
commercial transaction,' 8 where the "advertiser's interest is a purely
economic one. Traditionally, this type of speech was not accorded full
first amendment protection. In the last forty-seven years, however, the
note 215 and accompanying text, discussing a new promotion technique which could cut ad-
vertisers' expenses, but may not meet FDA requirements.
50. N.Y. Times, May 14, 1989, § 3, at 1, col. 2.
51. Comm. Print 1984, supra note 13, at 5-6.
52. See Cohen, Direct-to-the-Public Advertisement Prescription Drugs, 314 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 373 (1988); Wash. Post, Jan. 28, 1990, at HI; N.Y. Times, May 14, 1989, § 3, at 1, col.
2; Bernstein, supra note 2, at 46; Winters, Drug Ads OK to Docs, ADVERTISING AGE, Apr. 11,
1988; Informing patients: How Much, What Forms?, 127 DRUG Topics 10 (1983).
53. Comm. Print 1984, supra note 13, at 73-164.
54. Johnstone, supra note 34, at 318; Bernstein, supra note 2.
55. Palm, FDA Scrutinizing Drug Ads In Consumer Magazines, 17 MOD. HEALTHCARE
76 (Dec. 4, 1987); Bernstein, supra note 2.
56. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973).
57. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 761-73 (1976).
58. Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 385.
59. Virginia State Board, 425 U.S. at 762.
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Supreme Court has evolved a commercial speech doctrine which now
provides this speech with limited constitutional protection.
The Supreme Court articulated the original rule in Valentine v.
Chrestense,6 where it upheld a New York City ordinance in which distri-
bution of handbills, circulars, and other advertising material was forbid-
den on any street.6" The Court held that commercial speech was not
entitled to first amendment protection and thus could be regulated by
government to the same extent as commercial transactions. 62 In the case
of Breard v. Alexandria, the court upheld as a reasonable regulation an
ordinance prohibiting distribution of magazine subscriptions through
door-to-door solicitation without prior consent from the occupant or
homeowner. The Court reasoned that first amendment protection has
never been held absolute; the fact that a commercial transaction was in-
volved made the restriction on this method of distributing the communi-
cation reasonable." A distinction was made in Breard from an earlier
case, Martin v. Struthers,65 where the Court allowed the same manner of
distribution of information because Martin involved information about a
religious organization and contained "no element of the commercial.",
66
Subsequently, the Supreme Court interpreted the scope of first
amendment protection more broadly, and afforded certain types of com-
mercial advertising constitutional protection. The rationale behind this
change was that this speech was more than purely commercial because it
included some information of public interest and concern. Therefore,
such communication was distinguished upon its content. For instance,
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,6" the Supreme Court held that mate-
rial published in the form of a paid advertisement was entitled to consti-
tutional protection. 6' The New York Times advertisement in question
criticized police action taken against members of the civil rights move-
ment and requested financial assistance for various organizations devoted
to the cause. 9 Similarly, first amendment protection was given to an
advertisement for an abortion referral service in Bigelow v. Virginia70 on
the basis that there was a clear public interest in the information. The
court distinguished Bigelow from a case decided two years earlier, Pitts-
60. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
61. Id. at 53.
62. Id.
63. 341 U.S. 622 (1950).
64. Id. at 641-43.
65. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
66. Breard, 341 U.S. at 643 (discussing Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943)).
67. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
68. Id. at 266.
69. Id. at 254-66.
70. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
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burgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations.7" The Court
noted that in Bigelow, unlike in Pittsburgh Press, the commercial features
of the advertisement were merely incidental to the free flow of factual
information regarding abortion services.72 Pittsburgh Press also differed
in that the advertisement involved proposed an illegal transaction, dis-
criminatory hiring on the basis of sex.73 Therefore, the Bigelow court
implied that commercial speech itself may be illegal when it proposes
illegal conduct,7 4 just as the Pittsburgh Press court held that the discrimi-
natory ad could be prohibited.7" In sum, these three cases, New York
Times, Pittsburgh Press, and Bigelow stand for the proposition that ads
which propose commercial transactions can also convey information on
matters of public concern which the first amendment was intended to
protect.76 This distinction based on content can be viewed as an early
development of what has become the "lawful purpose" prong of the cur-
rent test for commercial speech.
The 1976 Supreme Court decision in Virginia State Board of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council"' was a turning point in
commercial speech doctrine. This case involved "purely commercial
speech" since only an economic transaction was proposed; the prescrip-
tion drug ads in question contained only price information. The
Supreme Court held explicitly that pure commercial speech is entitled to
limited first amendment protection.7" Thus, the Court attached impor-
tance to a consumer's private economic decisions by giving such interests
constitutional protection. 79 However, the opinion of the Court, written
71. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
72. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 821-22.
73. Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
74. 421 U.S. at 821.
75. Abortion was legal at this time. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Some feel that
this idea is "probably a misreading of Pittsburgh Press by the Bigelow court," but that the
"principle that commercial speech loses first amendment protection when it proposes an illegal
commercial transaction derives from" the Bigelow holding. Whelan, Common Sense and Com-
mercial Speech, 48 U. PrTr. L. REV. 1121, 1129 n.50 and accompanying text (1987). But cf
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69 (1983) ("The State may also prohibit
commercial speech related to illegal behavior") (quoting Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. 376
(1973)). This indicates that the Supreme Court has continued to interpret Pittsburgh Press as it
did in Bigelow whether or not that was a misreading.
76. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
77. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
78. Id. at 770.
79. Id. at 762. Given the consumption-driven society in the United States, this decision is
very important. However, some argue that Virginia State Board of Pharmacy evidences a re-
turn to principles of economic due process and that commercial speech should be afforded no
protection under the guise of free expression. Whelan, supra note 75, at 1131 n.61. The prob-
lem here is that regardless of how such information is categorized, it is information of public
concern.
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by Justice Blackmun, justified a more limited protection of commercial
speech because its accuracy is more easily verifiable and because it tends
to be less easily chilled given that profit is its motivation."0
Several cases involving the commercial speech doctrine which were
decided after Virginia State Board of Pharmacy but prior to Central Hud-
son " include ideas which are relevant to the question of prescription
drug advertising to consumers. In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 2 the
Court held that truthful and nonmisleading advertising by attorneys of
the prices for specific services is constitutionally protected."3 Justice
Blackmun, again writing the opinion for the Court, declared that "the
preferred remedy [for inaccurate or incomplete presentations] is more
disclosure rather than less" and that "the benefits of public ignorance"
are "dubious." 4 In addition to prohibition of attorney advertising which
is "false, deceptive, or misleading," the Bates court noted that reasonable
"time, place, and manner" restrictions are available methods of regulat-
ing attorney advertising. 5 In a concurring opinion, Justices Powell and
Stewart noted a fundamental difference between the advertising of pro-
fessional services and tangible products. With respect to professional
services, these Justices believed that there is a "vastly increased potential
for deception [and] enhanced difficulty of effective regulation in the pub-
lic interest." 6
In Chralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 7 an attorney sought to solicit
business directly and in-person from accident victims. The Court, up-
holding the prohibition of this behavior, opined that the state has power
to regulate commercial activity which is deemed harmful to the public
even when speech is part of that activity. 8
In 1979, the Supreme Court in Friedman v. Rogers 9 determined
the constitutionality of the Texas Optometry Act provisions regarding
the use of a trade name. These provisions forbade optometrists from
practicing under a trade name. 90 The Court distinguished this case from
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy 91 and upheld the statute as a permissi-
ble regulation in furtherance of the strong state interest in protecting the
80. 425 U.S. at 772, n,24.
81. See infra section III(B) of this Note.
82. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 375.
85. Id. at 383-84.
86. Id. at 390-91.
87. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
88. Id. at 456.
89. 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
90. Id.
91. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). See supra text accompanying notes 77-80.
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public from misleading and deceptive use of business names.9 2 The court
stated that a business or trade name was a form of commercial speech
with "no intrinsic meaning."93 Unlike an advertisement which at least
conveys price information or something about the nature of the services
or products offered by a business, a trade name may be entirely arbitrary
and fanciful, and convey nothing about the nature of a business until it
has acquired "meaning over a period of time by associations formed in
the minds of the public between the name"94 and the services offered.
Therefore, the majority rationalized that the potential for deception with
business names (in contrast to other forms of commercial speech) was
"substantial and well-demonstrated,"95 and outweighed what was "only
the most incidental effect on the content of commercial speech of Texas
optometrists."96 However, Justice Blackmun found the majority opinion
too broad.97 In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun proposed a test
which balanced the public and private interests protected by the first
amendment against the state interest in protecting the public.98 In his
view, Friedman "overestimate[d] the potential for deception and under-
estimate[d] the harmful impact of the broad sweep" of the regulation on
optometry trade names without engaging in the necessary rigid degree of
scrutiny required before state regulation of speech may be found
permissible.99
B. The Current Constitutional Standard for Commercial Speech-Central
Hudson
The Supreme Court subsequently adopted much of the argument
Justice Blackmun made in Friedman for a balancing approach to com-
mercial speech issues. One year after Friedman was decided, the
Supreme Court reviewed a New York regulation banning electric utilities
from promoting the use of electricity in Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n. 1° "Promotional" commercial speech
was distinguished from "institutional and informational" advertising,
92. 440 U.S. at 15. The Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits such "unfair methods
of competition." 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988). See FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212, 217-18
(1933), and Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 611-13 (1946), for further discussion of
trade names and property rights in trade names and unfair business practices.
93. 440 U.S. at 12.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 15.
96. Id. at 16.
97. Id. at 19-28 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
98. Id. at 20.
99. Id.
100. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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speech which is "not clearly intended to promote sales."10 1  The Public
Service Commission of New York had "declared all promotional adver-
tising contrary to the national policy of conserving energy."'' 0 2 The
Court ruled that the first amendment affords lesser protection to
commercial speech because of a "commonsense distinction" between
commercial and other forms of speech; 0 3 nevertheless, the first amend-
ment does protect such speech from "unwarranted governmental
regulation. ''
Central Hudson set forth a test which requires a four-part analysis.
First, for commercial speech to come within first amendment protection,
it must not be misleading or related to unlawful activity. Second, the
state interest in regulation must be found to be substantial. Third, if the
two previous questions are answered affirmatively, the regulation must
directly advance the governmental interest asserted. And fourth, the re-
striction of speech cannot be more extensive than necessary to serve that
interest. 05
Applying the test, the Central Hudson court held that while New
York's interest in energy conservation was clearly substantial and di-
rectly advanced by the regulations, the regulations were too restrictive of
speech. Less suppressive regulations could possibly have protected the
interest just as effectively.' °6
In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.,107 the Court applied the
Central Hudson test and held unconstitutional a statute which prohibited
mailing unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives. The Court char-
acterized these condom advertisements as "commercial" even though
they also contained discussions of venereal disease and family plan-
ning. 108 Because the statute provided only limited protection to the state
interest asserted, parental control over children's education about birth
control, it was held to be too restrictive of speech in that it "denie[d]
parents truthful information bearing on their ability to discuss birth con-
101. Id. at 559.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 562. The Court stated that: "Nevertheless, our decisions have recognized 'the
commonsense distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in
an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech.'" (quot-
ing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978)).
104. Id. at 561 (citing Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761-62 (1976)).
105. Id. at 564-66.
106. Justice Blackmun concurred with the judgment of the Court but noted that the test
developed by the majority was not consistent with prior cases and did not "provide adequate
protection for truthful, nonmisleading, noncoercive commercial speech." Id. at 573.
107. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
108. Id. at 67-68.
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trol and make informed decisions in this area. ' ' 1"9 In balancing the inter-
ests, the Bolger court held that this dissemination of truthful information
was such an important constitutional interest that the relative strength of
the state interest did not matter."10
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens criticized the opinion of the
court for creating an unwarranted impression that commercial speech is
a definite category of speech. 11' Instead, "advertisements may be com-
plex mixtures of commercial and noncommercial elements," the com-
mercial elements of which provide the "justification for regulation"
which might not otherwise be present."I2
Most recently the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Central Hudson
test' 3 by applying it in Posadas De Puerto Rico Ass'n v. Tourism Co. 1 4
Posadas involved restrictions on the advertising of casino gambling.
Hoping to aid the tourism industry, the Puerto Rico legislature in 1948
legalized certain forms of gambling but forbade the advertisement of
gambling parlors to its own citizens.' 15 The underlying state interest was
to discourage Puerto Rican residents from casino gambling. The Puerto
Rican statute was found to be facially constitutional.
This decision, however, may indicate that the Court has become
more willing to restrict speech in the interest of the public "good." The
Court considered the advertising involved in Posadas to have been moti-
vated purely by economics.16 In relation to the last two steps of Central
Hudson analysis, the Court held that the statute was reasonable in ad-
vancing Puerto Rico's interest in preventing its citizens from gambling
without being more extensive than necessary because it was only applica-
ble to advertising aimed directly at Puerto Rican residents.117 Therefore,
because the Posadas court applied the Central Hudson test, Central Hud-
son remains the vehicle by which permissible restriction of commercial
speech is determined.
109. Id. at 74.
110. Id. at 75.
111. Id. at 80-84.
112. Id. at 81 (Stevens, J., concurring).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 100-05.
114. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 340-44.
117. Id. at 341-43.
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IV
Application of Commercial Speech Doctrine to
Prescription Drug Advertising to Consumers
In order to determine whether prescription drug advertisements
which (1) are directed to consumers, (2) specifically name the drug, and
(3) relate information in addition to price, Is are protected under the first
amendment, we must perform the analysis set forth in Central
Hudson. 119
As a threshold requirement under Central Hudson, commercial
speech must concern lawful activity in order to receive first amendment
protection. 120 However, before legality can be determined, it is necessary
to define the activity. The underlying conduct may be determined by
analogy to Posadas12' and Pittsburgh Press 12 2 where the Court character-
ized the activities, respectively, as gambling and discriminatory hiring,
not the advertising of gambling or discriminatory hiring. Thus, the un-
derlying activity here is selling prescription drugs to consumers, which is
permissible as long as the appropriate standards are met 123 (i.e., licensed
physician issues prescription). Therefore, the commercial speech here
does not involve conduct which is illegal on its face.
Because consumers must obtain prescription drugs in a unique way,
a second description of the underlying activity seems reasonable: di-
recting prescription drugs to a particular audience--consumers, instead
of doctors. The next inquiry is whether such activity is prohibited by
law. As shown earlier, prescription drug advertising to consumers is not
specifically prohibited,'24 and therefore is not illegal conduct per se. If
such a statute existed, the essence of this Note would be to question its
constitutionality. The application of commercial speech doctrine to such
a statute would then require examination of the legality of the underlying
activity. This second option for characterizing the conduct at issue
would thereby reach the same starting point as the first and, therefore, is
an unnecessary step in the analysis.
118. These advertisements relate more than the price of the drug, and therefore would not
be considered reminder advertisements. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 100-05. Although consumers may not have been
the originally contemplated audience of the FDA regulations, the question of the constitution-
ality of advertising prescription drugs to consumers is distinct from, and unaffected by, the
lack of specific FDA regulation of this type of activity.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 100-05.
121. 478 U.S. 329 (1986).
122. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
123. 21 U.S.C. § 353(b) (1988).
124. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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Another requirement under Central Hudson is that the speech not
be misleading or fraudulent. 25 Some critics believe that prescription
drug advertising to consumers is inherently misleading. 26 Even if the
legal requirement of the "brief summary" is satisfied, it is argued that
consumers, unlike healthcare professionals who have had specialized ed-
ucation, do not possess the necessary medical expertise to fully under-
stand the risks presented by prescription drugs. Another argument is
that prescription drug advertising to consumers places the focus on the
economic aspect of the decision to "buy" drugs. There is concern that
this will only increase consumer demand for drugs in an already "over-
medicated" society, turning the decision to take a drug into merely an
economic one. 
27
These arguments are significantly countered by the law: only li-
censed medical practitioners are authorized to dispense prescriptions for
drugs. 12' Therefore, the physician-and not the patient/consumer-
makes the ultimate decision of what drug a patient will purchase. Thus,
it is most important that physicians, rather than consumers, are not mis-
led. The problem of an "over-medicated" society seems to be within the
physician's power to control.
As will be addressed, physicians stress that prescription drug ads
place undue pressure on the physician to prescribe a drug, thereby ad-
versely affecting the doctor-patient relationship.' 29 If this pressure actu-
ally exists, it is a problem in the medical system and, arguably, increased
patient awareness of medications is only a scapegoat for a deteriorating
relationship. 3 Also, the result of this pressure is not necessarily nega-
tive if it causes a physician to take economic considerations into account.
It may even be appropriate in some cases for the physician to help the
patient find an equally effective, but less expensive, drug.' 3 '
If such ads are found not to be inherently misleading, then, as long
as the "brief summary" is included in each ad in a nondeceptive man-
ner,132 each ad would satisfy the current FDA regulations. 33 In a staff
125. See supra text accompanying notes 100-05.
126. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 52; McGarey, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Con-
sumer Directed Information-Enhancing the Safety of Prescription Drug Use, 34 CATH. U.L.
REV. 117, 145-47 (1984); Comm. Print 1984, supra note 13, at 6.
127. See Cohen, supra note 52, at 375.
128. 21 U.S.C. § 353(b) (1988).
129. See Cohen, supra note 52, at 374-75.
130. Deutsch, The Brouhaha Over Drug Act, N.Y. Times, May 14, 1989, § 3, at 1, col. 2.
131. The use of generic drugs is a related topic but is beyond the scope of this Note.
132. The author does not wish to imply that it is a simple task to satisfy the FDA regula-
tions and notes the complexity and specificity of the requirements.




report, the House of Representatives Subcommittee expressed concern
that pharmaceutical manufacturers would not include necessary infor-
mation about the risks and side effects of certain drugs out of fear that
this type of information would not sell drugs.' 34 But, the FDA deter-
mines whether or not regulations have been complied with;135 and if
pharmaceutical manufacturers were to exclude required information, the
FDA would very likely find that the regulation's "fair balance" require-
ment had not been satisfied. 136 Therefore, a blanket prohibition of prod-
uct-specific advertising of prescription drugs to consumers on the basis of
potential deception does not withstand constitutional scrutiny.
In order to permit restriction of commercial speech, Central Hudson
analysis next requires that the governmental interest furthered be sub-
stantial. 37 There may be two ways to apply this prong of the test, de-
pending on whether prescription drug advertising to consumers is
considered a category of speech in itself or a subcategory of all prescrip-
tion drug advertising. If it is considered a distinct category of speech,
then restricting the entire category would be a complete ban on a particu-
lar kind of speech, and not mere regulation (which implies only partial
restriction). If the first amendment does not permit this entire category
of speech to be banned, then under this line of analysis, the first amend-
ment would mandate protection of the speech, and thus the Central Hud-
son analysis ends. But, if advertising prescription drugs to consumers is
considered only a subcategory of prescription drug advertising, then
prohibiting the subcategory of commercial speech (through regulation)
would not be the same as prohibiting the entire category. The state's
interest must then be found to be substantial in order to justify the regu-
lation under the first amendment. The governmental interest at stake-
protection of the public13 8 -is, unquestionably, considered substantial.
A. Current Regulations Adequately Protect the State Interest
In determining whether directly advertising prescription drugs to
consumers deserves first amendment protection, the final inquiries under
Central Hudson are "whether the regulation, or the prohibition, 39 di-
rectly advances the governmental interest asserted and whether the regu-
lation is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest."''
4
0
134. Comm. Print 1984, supra note 13, at 6.
135. 21 U.S.C. § 372(a), (e) (1988).
136. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(5)(ii), (6)(i)-(xx) (1988). See supra notes 27-29 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of this provision in the FDA regulations.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 100-05.
138. See, e.g., U.S. v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 232 U.S. 399, 409 (1914).
139. See supra text accompanying note 133.
140. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). See supra text accompanying note 104.
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The surest way to protect citizens from "harmful" advertising is to
prohibit it altogether. This sort of prohibition, on its face, seems to ad-
vance the state interest directly, but whether a prohibition advances a
state interest depends on how that interest is defined. If an aspect of the
state interest is that more information disseminated to the public is pref-
erable than less, 4 ' then a prohibition of prescription drug advertising to
consumers would not directly advance the state's interest. Thus, under
Central Hudson, complete prohibition would be much more extensive
than necessary to meet the state's needs.
The current FDA regulations appear to reach the middle ground
required by Central Hudson, so that both necessary protections of the
public and of speech (print and broadcast media) are accomplished. On
their face, the regulations avoid outright prohibition of the speech in
question; but because they are so stringent, the necessary protection of
the state interest is also accomplished. Therefore, the regulations di-
rectly advance state interests.
Since the regulations directly advance state interests without com-
pletely prohibiting the speech, the next question is whether regulations
are enough to satisfy--or go too far in protecting-the state interest.
This analysis culminates with a determination of the extent of the protec-
tions accorded by current FDA regulations.'42 The regulations cannot
be "more extensive than is necessary to serve" the state interest.'43 This
will be accomplished for prescription drug advertising if the regulations
adequately protect both the public and the dissemination of speech. In
exploring the underlying reasons for regulation of this particular type of
speech versus its outright prohibition, it is found that not only would full
prohibition of speech in this instance be constitutionally impermissible,
but that the current FDA regulations'" provide the best compromise
between the two conflicting interests. Central Hudson therefore man-
dates this conclusion.
The arguments relevant to whether Central Hudson permits a com-
plete prohibition of consumer-directed prescription drug advertising or
only regulation to the extent necessary to protect state interests can be
divided into three general categories: medical, constitutional, and
economic.
141. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1977).
142. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1988). See supra notes 12-33 and accompanying text.
143. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. See supra text accompanying note 104.
144. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1988). See supra notes 13-33 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 12:535
B. Medical Arguments
One of the strongest arguments in favor of forbidding advertising of
prescription drugs to consumers is that such advertising will adversely
affect the doctor-patient relationship, putting "pressure" on the doctor to
prescribe the medication that the patient requests. A patient is not
equipped with the necessary medical expertise to determine what drug is
best for himself or herself.145 Proponents of this argument also fear un-
necessary drug consumption.' 46 This conflict could occur when there is
a choice between drug treatment and another method. The doctor may
believe that the patient does not necessarily require drug treatment and
that it is preferable to avoid drug treatment unless absolutely necessary,
while the patient favors the quickest relief.
It must be determined if such pressure on a physician is likely to
occur. A physician should be able to avoid succumbing to such pressure
from a patient and refuse to prescribe the drug. Again, since a doctor is
the only one who can legally prescribe a drug, 147 he or she should be able
to explain why the drug being prescribed is best for the patient. This
could actually enhance the doctor-patient relationship by facilitating the
education of patients about the drugs that they take.' 4 1 In the same way,
if a patient has trouble understanding information in an advertisement,
the physician should be able to answer these questions. 49 Prescription
drug advertising to the consumer would allow a patient to take a more
active role in his or her treatment, possibly providing safer treatment
through more informed usage. 50 The above idea may presume that all
doctors are equally knowledgeable and well-informed about the drugs
they prescribe. But, even if doctors are not as informed as they should or
145. McGarey, supra note 126, at 145.
146. Cohen, supra note 52, at 375.
147. 21 U.S.C. § 353(b) (1972).
148. Advocate for consumer health, Charles Inlander, of the People's Medical Society,
agrees with this view in that "any information is better than none at all" and, by not ignoring
the consumer's intelligence, "everyone comes out ahead." Bernstein, supra note 2.
149. According to Angele D'Angelo, assistant dean of St. John's University pharmacy
school, Jamaica, N.Y., "If we believe in our ability to counsel patients, we should not fear
manufacturers' direct ads to consumers." APhA Endorses Manufacturers' Direct-to-Consumer
Rx Drug Ads, 197 AM. DRUGGIST 26, 28 (May 1988).
150. See McGarey, supra note 126, at 145-47. See also Rosenthal, Big Ad Revenues, Big
Obstacles Loom For Prescription TV, 35 TELEVISION/RADIO AGE 35, 36-37 (May 16, 1988).
In 1982, Boots Pharmaceuticals ran brand-name advertisements for Rufen, an arthritis drug
(now known as Ibuprofen and sold over-the-counter), for six weeks. At this time FDA regula-
tions were less specific. One result was the 1983 moratorium. But, a survey found increased
consumer awareness and more patient requests for Rufen from their doctors and pharmacists.
Id. at 36. "[P]atients better informed about the drugs prescribed for them are more likely to
understand and comply with instructions for taking them." Id. See also, Weck, Need Drug
Info? You Could Look It Up, 16 FDA CONSUMER 16 (Dec. 1982-Jan. 1983).
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could be, 5 ' a doctor is still better equipped than the average consumer to
study information about a drug and understand its uses and effects.
Physicians also may have an economic interest at stake. Some doc-
tors genuinely fear that they will lose patients if they refuse to prescribe
advertised drugs. While it seems absurd for a patient to behave this way,
given that physicians have the greater knowledge and skill in this area,
there are physicians who believe the risk is real.'52 However, if patients
already obtain second and third opinions regarding diagnoses, prescrip-
tion drug advertising to consumers would, logically, bring little change in
the way a patient chooses a doctor. Furthermore, if a doctor takes the
time to explain why a particular choice of medication is best for the pa-
tient, he or she might lessen the chance that the patient will switch
doctors.
Another argument previously noted is that forbidding prescription
drug advertising to consumers will prevent unnecessary drug consump-
tion. In fact, unnecessary drug consumption is better combatted by cut-
ting back on unnecessary drug prescription. The power remains in the
physician's hands. Since advertising may make consumers ask more
questions, 153 physicians should not avoid the extra responsibility of edu-
cating their patients about advertised drugs. 154 And, in the end, it must
be a physician's duty to say "no." Overprescription should then be
nonexistent. 155
Self-medication is another fear of those who favor prohibiting pre-
scription drug advertising to consumers. Self-medication may occur
when a person decides what medication is best for him or herself, or
when one person recommends medication to another. The latter may
include sharing drugs. This means that a person may give his or her left
over prescription drugs to another whom he or she believes has the same
medical ailment. The obvious danger is misuse. However, self-medica-
tion and misuse problems are already possible without prescription drug
151. One doctor believes that there is a great need for pharmaceutical manufacturers to
further educate doctors about the uses of medications and new drugs and that this would be a
more effective solution than prescription drug advertising directed at consumers. Interview
with Morton E. Ehrlich, M.D., in Sacramento, California (Jan. 30, 1989).
152. Id. See also Cohen, supra note 52, at 375.
153. See Rosenthal, supra note 150, at 36. The Rufen "campaign generated more than
6,000 requests for additional information." Id.
154. A positive outcome of prescription drug advertising to the consumer could be public
service advertisements (PSAs) on television, radio, and even in print media, directed to some of
the fears expressed by physicians. For example, such ads could inform about safe use. How-
ever, this would not eliminate the physician's duty to inform his or her patients about safety.
Unfortunately, PSAs are generally broadcast infrequently and late at night, thereby missing
large audiences.
155. This assumes that physicians are aware that their patients may have drugs prescribed
for them by more than one physician.
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advertising. Since these dangers exist, it would be difficult to prove that
prescription drug advertising to consumers causes misuse. In fact, adver-
tising directly to the consumer may cause self-medication (assuming it
does occur) to occur more safely because of the information requirements
in the FDA regulations. 56 Furthermore, physicians must be expected to
educate their patients about the correct use of drugs whether or not
advertised.
Prohibiting prescription drug advertising to consumers would not
eliminate all pressure on physicians to prescribe what a patient requests.
There are other situations in which the patient is a source of pressure on
the doctor to prescribe in a certain way.157 Also, other means are cur-
rently available from which consumers can obtain information about
drugs. The Physicians Desk Reference,158 for example, has recently been
a bestseller.1
59
A final issue for doctors is increased liability, but there has been no
mention of changing the legal standards." 6 Indeed, it would not be nec-
essary, as the current negligent medical malpractice standards are appli-
cable. 161 A doctor pressured into prescribing the "wrong" drug would
only be liable if that act was found to meet the test for negligent
malpractice.
C. Constitutional Arguments
It is evident from the availability and sales of books describing vari-
ous drugs that the public is interested in being better informed about the
drugs they are taking. 162 This fact supports constitutionally-based argu-
ments in favor of prescription drug advertising. In accord with Justice
Blackmun's concurrence in Central Hudson,16 3 suppressing speech is not
an appropriate way to give the public a particular message. Basically,
156. Week, supra note 150, at 19. See also supra notes 12-32 and accompanying text for
discussion of FDA regulations.
157. For example, a patient could pressure a doctor by requesting or refusing an operation.
It seems that the same arguments would apply here as to who can best suggest treatment.
158. PHYSICIANS DESK REFERENCE (38th ed. 1984). See also McGarey, supra note 126, at
141 n.140, 151 n.184. A television network's study found there was actual use of these refer-
ences. Comm. Print 1984, supra note 13, at 130-35.
159. Neumann, Rx Drugs and the Information Explosion, 197 AM. DRUGGIST 50 (Mar.
1988). For a listing of other drug reference books, see Weck, supra note 150, at 16-19.
160. See McGarey, supra note 126, at 147-50.
161. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965). "Unless he represents that
he has greater or less skill or knowledge, one who undertakes to render services in the practice
of a profession is required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members
of that profession.., in good standing in similar communities." Id.
162. See Weck, supra note 150, at 16.
163. 447 U.S. 557, 573-79 (1980). See also Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 234 (1984).
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more information is better than less."' This idea is even more persuasive
when coupled with a strong public desire to receive such information.165
It is also reasonable to conclude that increased public awareness would
enhance the safe use of drugs altogether.166
Opponents of prescription drug advertising may cite Ohraik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n 167 for the proposition that the state has power to regulate
commercial activity found harmful to the public even though the com-
mercial activity involves speech. However, Chralik cannot be taken as a
blanket prohibition, for the argument fails here on two grounds. First,
prescription drug advertising to consumers has not been conclusively
proven harmful to consumers. As shown in this Note, the harm is at
least debatable. Second, the power to regulate does not necessarily mean
the power to prohibit. The Central Hudson test 168 is in accord with this
point. Central Hudson requires balancing of competing interests and
thus gives some level of constitutional protection to commercial activities
involving speech.
Justice Stevens' argument in Bolger v. Young Drug Products
Corp.,169 that commercial speech is an indefinite category of speech, is
also relevant to an argument in favor of prescription drug advertising to
consumers. Such material is indefinite because purely economic informa-
tion is mixed with useful information about the drug's effectiveness.
Therefore, the speech deserves first amendment protection because it in-
volves not only economics, but a matter of public concern.170
Finally, in light of the recent Supreme Court decision in Posadas De
Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co.,17 which upheld specific restrictions
on the advertising of casino gambling, opponents of prescription drug
advertising may believe that aprohibition of prescription drug advertising
to consumers would similarly survive under the Central Hudson test.
Thus, gambling must be distinguished from prescription drug advertis-
ing. Gambling is a form of entertainment with, at best, a slight chance of
financial gain; while the sale of prescription drugs represents the poten-
tial for physical and mental health, obviously a more important public
interest. The strength of a state's interest in preventing its citizens from
wasting their money should not be discounted. But when the two activi-
164. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 573-79.
165. "Most pharmacists report that more and more people are asking about their prescrip-
tions." Weck, supra note 150, at 16.
166. Id.
167. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
168. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). See supra text accompanying note 104.
169. 463 U.S. 60, 80-84 (1983).
170. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
171. 478 U.S. 328 (1986). See supra text accompanying notes 114-18.
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ties are compared, prescription drugs are generally considered more ben-
eficial to consumers than gambling. Notwithstanding the importance of
prescription drugs, the issue here remains the prohibition of advertising
prescription drugs and only those ads directed to consumers. In Posadas,
the Court held that gambling could have been entirely prohibited, hence
the restriction of advertising was reasonable.' 72 But the same is not true
for prescription drug advertising. It is highly doubtful that prescription
drugs could be banned. Consequently, the argument that the "greater
power... necessarily includes the lesser power"' 73 would be inapposite.
Finally, these two types of advertising differ in that drug advertisements
will never consist solely of economic information if the statutory require-
ments are met.1
74
Physicians and other health care professionals have long served as
the main source of drug information for consumers. This paternalistic
custom has become known as the "learned intermediary" and "single
source" rule."7" Generally, "the physician acts as an intermediary be-
tween the manufacturer and consumer;" thus, the "drug manufacturer
discharges its duty to warn the ultimate user" of a "drug's dangerous
propensities" by supplying such information to physicians.176 It has been
urged that the public has a right to have information about the drugs
they are taking. The increased public demand for information about
drugs, combined with the constitutional argument in favor of more
speech rather than less, calls for an end to the single source rule. Pre-
scription drug advertising to consumers would provide one way of mak-
ing such a change.
Another argument in favor of prohibiting prescription drug adver-
tising to consumers is that average readers will ignore information on
risks, whether or not they understand it. '17 This argument is based on an
analogy between information which must be contained in prescription
drug advertisements and the danger warnings which are placed on ciga-
rette advertisements and packages: since so many Americans still smoke,
the danger warning is either being ignored or disbelieved.' 7 There seems
to be no way of forcing consumers to take notice of the warnings con-
tained in prescription drug advertisements. Also, advertising agencies
172. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 346.
173. Id at 345-46.
174. See supra notes 12-32 and accompanying text regarding regulation of prescription
drug advertising.
175. See McGarey, supra note 126, at 122-29, for a general discussion of the evolution of
the "learned intermediary" and "single source" rules.
176. Id at 122-23.
177. Cohen, supra note 52, at 374.
178. Id.
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can successfully design ads so that the relevant information is unobtru-
sive by using graphic designs and reduced print.'79 This implies that de-
ception is likely. But since it is a physician who authorizes use of a drug,
the reader does not have to take account of information in an ad about
the risks of a drug. Such information should be included for those who
want it. Also, if the physical design of an ad alone makes it deceptive,
then that is enough for it to fail under the FDA regulations. That people
may ignore warnings and advertisers may be able to hide disclosures does
not necessarily mean the only solution is to bar prescription drug adver-
tising. Instead, these factors call for effective enforcement of the current
regulations and possibly for stricter regulations.
D. Economic Arguments
The principal reason many people are opposed to product-specific
prescription drug advertising to consumers is that they believe advertis-
ing seeks to increase sales and not knowledge. Moreover, some doctors,
members of Congress, and especially consumers groups believe that there
is an inherent conflict between promotional advertising and providing
adequate, objective drug information.I" These people feel that "benefi-
cial advertising" is a contradiction in terms,18' and that one result of
such advertising will be increased costs of medication. Pharmaceutical
manufacturers must spend more money to pay for advertising to con-
sumers (in addition to that spent on advertising to doctors). The costs of
such advertising will be passed to consumers without "real" benefit to
them from the advertising.182 These individuals also believe that the
profit incentive will be greater than the incentive to educate the public;
and therefore, advertising agencies and television networks will be the
real winners.
As noted, it is at least arguable that consumers will receive no bene-
fits from prescription drug advertising. However, slight increases in the
price of a drug may be acceptable to some consumers in exchange for
greater knowledge about a drug and the possibility of safer, more effec-
tive use.' 83 Furthermore, manufacturers' incentives to educate the pub-
179. Id.
180. Id. at 375. Advertising probably falls somewhere between efficient provision of infor-
mation and exploitation of buyers' imperfect access to it. See Hurwitz & Caves, Persuasion or
Information? Promotion and the Shares of Brand Name and Generic Pharmaceuticals," 31 J.L.
& EcON. 299 (1988).
181. Cohen, supra note 52, at 375. "[T]he principles of advertising--those of salesmanship
in print-are incompatible with education." Id.
182. Id.
183. Statistics are necessary to show how much advertisers spend and how much an in-
crease in money spent for advertising of prescription drugs will cause incremental increases in
price.
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lic is irrelevant here because they have no choice. Manufacturers must
comply with the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act' 84 and the FDA regula-
tions 185 promulgated thereunder. If they do not, they are subject to sanc-
tion. Therefore, because of the stringent FDA requirements, the goal of
educating or providing information to the public will be achieved
through compliance with the regulations.'86
The quality of this education depends on effective FDA enforcement
of the regulations, and enforcement methods may need to be im-
proved. '87 Given the conflicting interests at stake, the regulatory method
is actually middle ground. Effective enforcement is thus the most impor-
tant concern in activating this solution. In 1988, the FDA exercised its
power and discontinued a newspaper ad run by the Sandoz Corporation,
not because the ad was directed at consumers, but because it contained
inaccurate claims.188 The FDA had made a mistake in allowing the ad to
run in the first place. 18 9
Increased cost may be one drawback to advertising prescription
drugs to consumers, but, in light of the potential benefits of such infor-
mation (public education, safer drug consumption), it is not reason
enough to completely suppress speech. Also, it has not been proven that
advertising fosters anti-competitive prices. In fact, drug prices might
fall. 190 A business' decision to advertise involves an analysis of the costs
to the business and the expected effect of advertising on sales. Even if it
is an economic decision for a manufacturer, it does not necessarily follow
that the consumer will be deceived or will not be educated. FDA regula-
tions still apply, and if they are not met, the FDA may discontinue the ad
(assuming the FDA enforces the regulations effectively),' 9' and sanction
184. 21 US.C. §§ 301-92 (1988).
185. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1988).
186. However, problems may occur with what information is contained in the ad and how
it is presented.
187. See Comm. Print 1984, supra note 13, at 60-65, for details on the FDA corrective
procedure and statistics on action taken from 1971 to 1983.
188. Winters, Why the FDA Made Sandoz Pull Drug Ad, ADVERTISING AGE, at 70 (Feb.
29, 1988).
189. Id. This presents another problem: exposing the public to inaccurate claims in ads
before the ads are discontinued. This may call for prior approval of ads and especially for
close scrutiny of scientific claims as to whether the advertising is directed to professionals or
the lay public.
190. Cohen, supra note 52, at 375. An economist who is in favor of advertising prescrip-
tion drugs to consumers, Alison Masson, believes it is possible that drug prices could fall as a
result of such advertising. "'If you look at retail markets where advertising was introduced,
prices fell.'" Gladwell & Farhi, Drug Firms Offering New Prescription for TV Ads, Wash.
Post, Jan. 28, 1990, at HI.
191. It must be determined what effective enforcement means. This requires further study
and surveying beyond the scope of this Note.
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the manufacturer. 92 The specific and detailed guidelines for prescription
drug advertising 193 thus eliminate the purported contradiction between
promotional advertising and public education.
A 1988 study of drug advertisements, 194 noted by Eric Cohen, M.D.
in his article opposing direct-to-consumer prescription drug advertis-
ing, 195 showed that large amounts of money must be invested in order to
achieve high levels of sales of drugs with benefits that are not clearly
established. For drugs with well-established benefits, advertising has less
effect on sales. However, commonsense supports the survey's single find-
ing that lesser known drugs need more advertising than those that are
well known. 196 Although advertising better known drugs did not in-
crease sales in the survey, it may still have increased consumer aware-
ness. Logic dictates that companies must expend more money and
resources to publicize a drug which is not very well known, in order for it
to attain the same level of pervasiveness as one that already is well-
known. Therefore, the results of this study merely support a common-
sense idea about product promotion and do not strengthen the arguments
against advertising prescription drugs to consumers.
Some critics believe that advertising rewards persuasiveness and not
efficacy. '97 Although the slickest ads may often be the most successful in
obtaining increased sales, prescription drugs not only carry stringent ad-
vertising regulations, they also differ fundamentally from other products.
The decision to purchase a particular prescription drug is not made by
the reader or viewer, but by a licensed physician who has spent years
acquiring the necessary medical expertise to make such determina-
tions. '98 If a physician is "hooked" 99 merely by the persuasiveness of an
ad, then perhaps he or she is not practicing in accord with professional
standards. It is possible for an ad to be truthful, yet very persuasive.
Also, consumer satisfaction is more acutely necessary when the product
is medical treatment. Efficacy of drugs will then be rewarded naturally
because patients seek the fastest relief with the least adverse effects.
192. 21 U.S.C. §§ 352(n), 331(a), 332(a), 333(a) (1972); 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1988). See
supra text accompanying notes 12-33.
193. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1988).
194. Cohen, supra note 52, at 374 (discussing Kerr & Drobny, Advertising Prescription
Drugs to the Public, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 523 (1986)).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id at 375 (citing Draper, The Faithless Shepherd, 33 N.Y. REV. BooKs 11, 14-18
(1986)). This proposition serves as justification for several opponents of prescription drug ad-
vertising to consumers. See Cohen, supra note 52, at 375; Rosenthal, supra note 150, at 37;
Palm, supra note 55, at 76.
198. 21 U.S.C. § 353(b) (1972).
199. This would be a frightening demonstration of the power of the media.
HASTINGS COMMi/ENT L.J. [Vol. 12:535
CONSUMER-DIRECTED ADVERTISING
Also, physicians generally monitor their patients' reactions to the drugs
they are taking, so it follows that a drug's effectiveness does play an im-
portant part in the physician's decision to prescribe it.
One point, especially, weakens economic arguments against pre-
scription drug advertising to consumers. Opponents may assume that
drug manufacturers will saturate the market with name-brand ads.
However, all drugs are not conducive to widespread public advertising.
Selective advertising is most appropriate and beneficial for manufactur-
ers. For example, advertising would not make much difference for drugs
used to treat unusual illnesses or conditions, or for drugs given only in
the hospital, since, little choice is involved. But for non-life-threatening
conditions such as arthritis, baldness, or the common cold, the patient
plays a more active role in selecting a suitable remedy. °" These drugs,
many of which will soon become OTCs, are most appropriate for con-
sumer advertising even though they comprise only a tiny portion of the
total market.2° ' In addition, manufacturers must limit drug advertising
to specific audiences in order to save on advertising costs. 20 2 It is prohib-
itively expensive to advertise every drug across the board, not to mention
the extra space such ads require to satisfy FDA regulations.20 a
The above discussion offers only partial relief for those favoring pro-
hibition of consumer-directed prescription drug ads, but additional prac-
tical problems in satisfying the regulations effectively help block
widespread dissemination of these ads.2' 4 First, if there is little demand
for a particular drug, advertising does not always have much effect on
sales.2"5 Second, in most instances it is simply cheaper to avoid the FDA
regulations and not mention a drug's name. Television and print ads
generally require more space to provide the necessary information, and
200. Bernstein, supra note 2.
201. Id. " 'One of the biggest problems.., is the perception that we're talking about a
broad range of products. . . .We're talking only about chronic, non-life threatening situa-
tions-drugs that eventually go over-the-counter. It's been estimated that not more than 25%
of all prescription drugs would be appropriate.' " Rosenthal, supra note 150, at 36.
202. For example, ads may target specific groups through periodicals designed for those
groups (e.g., for the elderly-Modern Maturity Magazine). But, target advertising is not al-
ways simple. For example, "[i]t's a problem [on TV] trying to find that concentrated group of
angina sufferers." The Big Push: Some Prescription Drug Ads Name Names, NEWSDAY, July
9, 1989, at 42.
203. Freeman, Nicorette Push; Stop-smoking Gum Aims to Stir Brand Awareness, ADVER-
TISING AGE, at 67 (June 19, 1989).
204. One might think manufacturers would be dissuaded by the increased effort and cost it
takes to design the brief summary in a manner which the lay consumer can understand. But
this probably would not occur since manufacturers need not gear the summary to the con-
sumer. From the manufacturer's standpoint, the ad merely must trigger the patient to ask the
physician for a drug by name.
205. There are many other factors involved in how a product sells. For example, the non-
branded advertising of Tagamet had little effect on sales. Deutsch, supra note 130.
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radio need scarcely be considered here. The extra costs of advertising,
even if there is media innovation, may not be offset by expected increases
in sales. It must be determined whether this added morsel of consumer
recognition will really benefit manufacturers.
V
Recent Developments
As has been shown, there has not been and probably will not be an
explosion in consumer-directed prescription drug advertising because of
prohibitive costs and the limited suitability of most drugs. For television
advertising, the networks themselves provide additional barriers to phar-
maceutical advertisers because of their own policies. In December, 1989,
CBS was the only network that agreed to air a 15-second brand-name
spot for Nicorette, a chewing gum containing a drug aimed at reducing
cigarette smoking. ABC gave " 'conditional approval' pending further
review of the commercial," and NBC's own policy forced the network to
flatly reject the ad even after the FDA had approved it.
2°6
Researchers are still looking into the issues. The University of
Michigan recently received money from the Prescription Drug Advertis-
ing Coalition, made up of advertising, media, and pharmaceutical com-
panies, to study the impacts of prescription drug advertising to
consumers. 20 7 A recent Harvard study found that campaigns aimed at
selling drugs probably result in more prescriptions being written.208
However, the Harvard study was inconclusive and dealt with the effects
of advertising on doctors. Though this concern is significant, it is a sepa-
rate issue not addressed in this Note.
Recently, a creative solution to the practical problems of meeting
the regulations has been proposed. The Prescription Drug Advertising
Coalition petitioned for permission from the FDA to run TV commer-
cials for four popular prescription drugs for six months to test its new
idea. The ads will be short, name the drug, provide a brief warning
about the risks, and will be accompanied by a toll-free telephone number
that consumers can call for extra information. The industry wants to
prove that this would be just as effective as providing the full summary
presently required by the regulations.2 9 Though this new idea will prob-
ably have little effect on opponent's arguments, it could prove to be an
enormous breakthrough in reducing costs for advertisers, if the method is
206. Freeman, supra note 203.
207. Deutsch, supra note 130.
208. Id.
209. Gladwell & Farhi, supra note 190.
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approved. Still, all drugs would not be suitable for advertising even in
this manner.
Another possible solution is that advertisers could obtain prior ap-
proval for their ads from the FDA as a precautionary measure. This
might take additional resources and staff such as a special committee, but
it is worth considering. Prior approval is already available to advertisers
since the regulations require it in extreme cases.210
VI
Conclusion
Upon application of the test for commercial speech articulated in
Central Hudson,"' it is preferable to "err" on the side of allowing pre-
scription drug advertising to be directed to consumers. A complete ban
on prescription drug advertising to consumers is more extensive than
necessary to satisfy state interests while the applicable FDA regula-
tions2"2 in their current specificity meet the four-pronged test of Central
Hudson. Current FDA regulations apply to lawful activity which is not
facially misleading. The regulations directly advance a substantial gov-
ernmental interest and are not more extensive than necessary. The regu-
lations also adequately protect the respective interests which include: the
state's interest in protecting the public, the public's interest in acquiring
this information, the manufacturer's interest in disseminating this infor-
mation (to increase safety as well to increase sales), the physician's inter-
est in fostering safe and effective treatment of patients, and finally, the
constitutionally-guaranteed protection of worthy speech. As a substan-
tial amount of controversy currently surrounds this issue, the most im-
portant and least problematic message a prescription drug advertisement
must carry is to: "See your doctor."21
210. 21 C.F.R. § 202.10) (1988).
211. See supra text accompanying note 105.
212. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1988).
213. Rosenthal, supra note 150, at 36.
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